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THE DOXING DILEMMA: SEEKING A REMEDY
FOR THE MALICIOUS PUBLICATION
OF PERSONAL INFORMATION
Julia M. MacAllister*
In recent years, malevolent actors have seized upon a new tool to harass,
silence, threaten, and injure people online: doxing—the malicious
publication of personal identifying information like a home address.
Although doxing is an online tool, it causes concrete and serious harm to
victims by moving harassment from the Internet to the physical world.
Congress and state legislatures have begun to address different forms of
cyberharassment. However, no effective and consistent legal remedy for
doxing currently exists. This Note examines and critiques current federal
and state schemes, and it ultimately proposes that lower federal courts
should adopt a new intent standard to make the federal Interstate
Communications Statute more applicable to doxing and that states can and
should criminalize malicious doxing.
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INTRODUCTION
On the night of October 10, 2014, a Twitter user named “Death to
Brianna” began to tweet rape and death threats targeted at Brianna Wu,
head of development at independent game studio Giant Spacekat.1 The
user’s picture, appearing next to each tweet, was a photo of Wu and her
husband.2 The user described in graphic detail how he planned to rape,
murder, and mutilate Wu, kill her children, and torture her husband
imminently.3 Within four minutes of the harassment starting, the user
1. Caitlin Dewey, In the Battle of Internet Mobs vs. the Law, the Internet Mobs Have
Won, WASH. POST (Feb. 17, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theintersect/wp/2016/02/17/in-the-battle-of-internet-mobs-vs-the-law-the-internet-mobs-havewon [https://perma.cc/J7N9-8LF5].
2. Brianna Wu (@Spacekatgal), TWITTER (Oct. 10, 2014, 8:57 PM),
https://twitter.com/Spacekatgal/status/520739878993420290/ [perma.cc/VK5M-SLPP].
3. Id.
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wrote: “Guess what bitch? I now know where you live. You and Frank
live at [home address redacted].”4
Fearing for her life, Wu fled her home in the middle of the night with her
family.5 Her harassers have not been charged.6 Wu, like many other
people who use the Internet daily,7 had been doxed.8 Doxing is a form of
cyberharassment9 involving the public release of personal information that
can be used to identify or locate an individual, such as a home address,
email address, phone number, social security number, and employer or
school contact information.10
The injuries suffered by victims of cyberharassment are well
documented: “post-traumatic stress disorder, depression, and serious
emotional distress[,] . . . ‘changes in sleeping and eating patterns,
nightmares, hyper-vigilance, anxiety, helplessness, fear for safety, and
shock and disbelief.’”11 Thus, the law creates penalties for some types of
cyberharassment such as threats transmitted over state lines,12 stalking,13
and swatting14 (a wrong-premises SWAT raid of an innocent person’s
home15). However, this Note argues that the current statutory and common

4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Anna Merlan, The Cops Don’t Care About Violent Online Threats. What Do We Do
Now?, JEZEBEL (Jan. 29, 2015, 3:10 PM), http://jezebel.com/the-cops-dont-care-aboutviolent-online-threats-what-d-1682577343 [https://perma.cc/VU56-R7TE].
7. See Abby Ohlheiser, The Leslie Jones Hack Used All the Scariest Tactics of Internet
Warfare at Once, WASH. POST (Aug. 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theintersect/wp/2016/08/26/the-leslie-jones-hack-used-all-the-scariest-tactics-of-internetwarfare-at-once (describing the doxing and racist harassment that Leslie Jones faced after
appearing in the film Ghostbusters) [https://perma.cc/24WR-2WMX]; Adi Robertson, Trolls
Drive Anita Sarkeesian out of Her House to Prove Misogyny Doesn’t Exist, VERGE (Aug. 27,
2014, 3:41 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2014/8/27/6075179/anita-sarkeesian-says-shewas-driven-out-of-house-by-threats (reporting that a feminist critic and her parents were
doxed after she posted videos “aggregating and analyzing games that portray women as
damsels in distress, ornamental eye candy, incidental victims, and other archetypes that tend
to be written in service of and subordinate to male players and characters”) [perma.cc/YD764DLY].
8. Dewey, supra note 1.
9. Cyberharassment enables actors “to harass their victims on a scale never before
possible,” with their conduct having both an “immediate effect” and “global dissemination.”
John B. Major, Cyberstalking, Twitter, and the Captive Audience: A First Amendment
Analysis of 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2), 86 S. CAL. L. REV. 117, 126 (2012).
10. See Mary Anne Franks, Professor, Univ. of Miami Sch. of Law, Remarks at the
American Bar Association Program on Doxing, Swatting, Trolls, and SJWs: Harassment
and Gender Discrimination on Social Media Platforms (Nov. 8, 2016) (on file with the
Fordham Law Review).
11. Major, supra note 9, at 126 (quoting Nicolle Parsons-Pollard & Laura J. Moriarty,
Cyberstalking—What’s the Big Deal?, in CONTROVERSIES IN VICTIMOLOGY 103, 108 (Laura
J. Moriarty ed., 2d ed. 2008)).
12. See 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012).
13. See id. § 2261A.
14. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 148.3 (West 2014) (criminalizing the act of making
fraudulent emergency calls to cause SWAT raids of an innocent person’s home).
15. See Rex M. Shannon III, Comment, Nightmare on Your Street: Moving Towards
Justice for Innocent Victims of Wrong-Premises SWAT Raids, 77 MISS. L.J. 669, 670–72
(2007).
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law regime fails to provide a reliable remedy for doxing victims.16
Specifically, the law does not address situations in which an actor uses
doxing for purely malicious purposes, such as revenge, harassment, or
stalking, as opposed to political purposes or internal regulation.
Of course, some or all of the dispersed information might already be
public information.17 However, the semipublic nature of this information
should not provide blanket immunity for a malicious actor who wields an
individual’s personal information as a tool to harass, threaten, intimidate,
and injure that person.
In addition, the complex and intangible nature of doxing should not act as
an excuse for lack of regulation, because “[t]oday, with smartphones and
endless social media platforms, there is no difference between online and
offline life. It is all just life.”18 In fact, when an actor doxes an
individual—as opposed to harassing that individual in person—the harms
caused by that harassment are amplified due to the conduct’s “permanent
quality that real world conduct lacks.”19 Moreover, doxing can incite
individuals other than the actor to commit or threaten real-world violence
because it entails the distribution of a subject’s personal information to a
broad and unknowable audience.20 Indeed, experts warn that “[a]s people
realize what an effective attack [doxing] can be, and how an individual can
use the tactic to do considerable damage, . . . we’re going to see a lot more
of it.”21 Accordingly, a remedy for doxing is needed.
This Note examines the vast injuries doxing causes when used for purely
malicious reasons and assesses whether an appropriate and successful legal
remedy for this form of doxing can exist. Part I defines doxing, narrows the
scope of this Note to “punching down” doxing, and examines the
underlying doctrines of privacy and First Amendment law. Next, Part II
analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of three relevant federal laws—the

16. See DANIELLE KEATS CITRON, HATE CRIMES IN CYBERSPACE 19 (2014) (“Victims are
told not to expect any help: ‘This is the INTERNET folks. . . . There are no laws here, at
least not clearly defined ones.’” (alteration in original)). But see, e.g., H.B. 225, 61st Leg.,
Gen. Sess. (Utah 2016) (cybercrime statute amendments).
17. See Franks, supra note 10.
18. See Marissa Lang, Revenge Porn Is Target of Intimate Privacy Protection Act, S.F.
CHRON. (Sept. 30, 2016, 8:22 PM), http://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/IntimatePrivacy-Protection-Act-to-take-on-9517671.php (quoting the author of revenge porn
legislation Representative Jackie Speier) [https://perma.cc/JCG5-D7YK].
19. Major, supra note 9, at 126.
20. See, e.g., Jason Slotkin, “Pizzagate” Suspect Planned “Possibly” Violent Raid,
Investigators Say, NPR (Dec. 13, 2016, 3:22 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2016/12/13/505424283/pizzagate-suspect-faces-federal-charge (describing a man who,
motivated by a baseless Internet rumor, went to a Washington, D.C., restaurant and fired an
assault rifle) [https://perma.cc/TZS2-24HN]. See generally Matthew James Enzweiler,
Swatting Political Discourse: A Domestic Terrorism Threat, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2001,
2007 (2015) (discussing prank 911 calls resulting in heavily armed SWAT team responses to
subjects’ homes, and noting that “the risk of injury or death is beyond question in these
instances”).
21. Bruce Schneier, The Rise of Political Doxing, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Nov. 2, 2015,
6:47 AM), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/11/the_rise_of_pol.html [https://
perma.cc/4Y6G-R6U5].
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Communications Decency Act, the Interstate Communications Statute, and
the Interstate Stalking Statute—and a proposed bill. Part II also assesses
the strengths and weaknesses of state criminal and common law approaches
to cyberharassment and discusses the efficacy of these approaches to
doxing. Then, Part III offers a blended solution and proposes that (1)
federal courts should adopt the recklessness standard left open by the U.S.
Supreme Court in Elonis v. United States22 and (2) states can and should
create or amend criminal laws addressing doxing because the doxing of a
subject’s home address is a true threat and thus can be regulated under the
true threat exception to the First Amendment.
I. DROPPING DOX: UNDERSTANDING THE PROBLEM
AND ITS UNDERLYING DOCTRINES
Part I.A defines doxing and distinguishes it from other types of
cyberharassment, and Part I.B discusses the three ways actors could use
doxing as a tool for harassment. Specifically, Part I.B narrows the focus of
this Note to instances in which actors use doxing for purely malicious
reasons, as opposed to political purposes or internal regulation. Finally,
Part I.C introduces two rights that are directly affected by doxing: the right
to privacy and the First Amendment’s right to freedom of speech.
A. Doxing Defined
While the term’s origin is not certain, “doxing” likely dates back to 2001
and the hacker group known as Anonymous.23 “‘Dox’ is a longstanding
shortening of ‘documents’ or ‘to document,’ especially in technology
industries.”24 Scholars and journalists define “doxing” in various ways
because it is not a defined legal term.25 In an effort to apply a more

22. 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
23. Bruce Schneier, Doxing as an Attack, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY (Jan. 2, 2015,
7:21 AM), https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2015/01/doxing_as_an_at.html [https://
perma.cc/VL4R-5VC2].
24. Grant Barrett, Opinion, Words of 2012, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 2012),
https://nyti.ms/2kBAuDs [https://perma.cc/4ED5-VVGV].
25. For example, Sarah Jeong defines doxing as “the publication of a physical residential
address, or information protected by law.” Sarah Jeong, Stop Diluting the Definition of
“Dox,” SARAHJEONG DOT NET (July 8, 2015), https://sarahjeong.net/2015/07/08/stopdiluting-the-definition-of-dox/ [https://perma.cc/6Y3P-AS4W].
Gabriella Coleman,
however, does not limit her definition of doxing to legally protected information; rather, she
defines doxing as “the leaking of private information—such as Social Security numbers,
home addresses, or personal photos.” GABRIELLA COLEMAN, HACKER, HOAXER,
WHISTLEBLOWER, SPY 7 (2015). Similarly, Danielle Keats Citron notes that doxing can
occur when “[t]rolls post individuals’ phone numbers, addresses, and social security
numbers.” CITRON, supra note 16, at 53. “Trolls” refers to persons who post deliberately
erroneous or antagonistic messages to a newsgroup or similar forum with the intention of
eliciting a hostile or corrective response. COLEMAN, supra, at 32 (defining trolls as “agents
of cultural digestion [who] scavenge the landscape, re-purpose the most offensive material,
then shove the resulting monstrosities into the faces of an unsuspecting populace”). Further,
Bruce Schneier defines doxing as “the practice of publishing personal information about
people without their consent.” Schneier, supra note 23.
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inclusive definition of doxing, this Note adopts Professor Mary Anne
Frank’s definition:
The public release of an individual’s private, sensitive, personal
information, such as:
• Home address, email address, phone number
• Social security number
• Employer and employer contact info
• Family member’s contact info
• Photos of victim’s children and the school they attend.26

This definition of doxing concerns publicly available information that
would not necessarily require a hack to access.27 In addition, this Note
adopts the term “actor” to describe the person who doxes and the term
“subject” to describe the person who is doxed.
Doxing rarely occurs in isolation.28 Rather, doxing is often used as a tool
by multiple actors within a greater campaign to harass one subject.29
Actors dox in conjunction with other forms of harassment, such as revenge
porn30 and swatting.31 However, these other forms of cyberharassment are
distinguishable from doxing because they involve conduct rooted in older
areas of law such as copyright32 and manipulation of technology integrated
in telecommunications channels.33 Statutes concerning cyberharassment
often draw directly from original offline stalking and harassment laws.34
26. Franks, supra note 10.
27. The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) criminalizes the misuse of a computer
or the use of a computer in excess of a user’s authorization. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2012). This
statute could be used to prosecute actors who dox private information acquired by hacking.
See, e.g., Sarah A. Constant, The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act: A Prosecutor’s Dream
and a Hacker’s Worst Nightmare—The Case Against Aaron Swartz and the Need to Reform
the CFAA, 16 TUL. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 231, 241 (2013) (discussing the case against a
defendant who hacked JSTOR, an academic articles subscription service, and made articles
available for free online). Doxing cases that do not involve a hack are not prosecutable
under this statute.
28. See COLEMAN, supra note 25, at 44.
29. See id. Coleman describes Anonymous’s 2010 harassment of Jessi Slaughter, a
preteen video blogger. This harassment included “publish[ing] her phone number, address,
and Twitter username, inundating her with hateful emails and threatening prank calls,
circulating photoshopped images of her and satiric remixes of her videos.” Id. She
ultimately became an online “object of ridicule,” forever associated with the term
“lulzcow . . . whore.” Id.; see also Jessi Slaughter, URBAN DICTIONARY (July 15, 2010),
http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term=Jessi+Slaughter&defid=5099483
[https://perma.cc/3JAZ-56HU].
30. See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1098–99 (9th Cir. 2009) (describing the
doxing of Cecilia Barnes in conjunction with the publication of pornographic photos taken
without her consent).
31. See Kevin Poulsen, Blind Hacker Sentenced to 11 Years in Prison, WIRED (June 29,
2009, 7:28 PM), https://www.wired.com/2009/06/blind_hacker/ (discussing Matthew
Weigman’s confession to making “hundreds of false calls to police that sent armed SWAT
teams bursting into the homes of [his] enemies”) [https://perma.cc/QRC7-28GV].
32. Layla Goldnick, Coddling the Internet: How the CDA Exacerbates the Proliferation
of Revenge Porn and Prevents a Meaningful Remedy for Its Victims, 21 CARDOZO J.L. &
GENDER 583, 610 (2015).
33. Enzweiler, supra note 20, at 2004.
34. Nancy Leong & Joanne Morando, Communication in Cyberspace, 94 N.C. L. REV.
105, 114–15 (2015).
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Many harassment laws were drafted in the 1990s when the Internet’s usage
was dramatically different from today.35 In 1997, 18 percent of Americans
used the Internet; today, 87 percent do.36 Accordingly, the scale of harm
doxing causes today is much greater than when legislatures drafted many
applicable statutes.
In addition, doxing concerns the release of information that could
otherwise be publicly available, unlike revenge porn and swatting.37 By
doxing a subject’s home address or other information that can be used to
locate a subject, an actor moves the harassment from the Internet into the
physical world, putting the subject in actual physical danger. In addition,
doxing makes personal information more accessible to the entire Internet,
increasing the harassment by putting the subject at risk of injury or violence
from a large audience in a way that other forms of harassment do not.38
Nonetheless, in many cases, other forms of harassment are redressable, but
there is no consistent legal remedy for doxing.39
B. Doxing Actors and Their Intent;
Doxing Subjects and Their Injuries
Doxing is a tool, and the intent behind its use determines the proper
approach for analyzing it. For the purpose of seeking a remedy, this Note
recognizes three categories of doxing determined by the actor’s intent: (1)
punching down doxing (i.e., doxing for purely malicious purposes); (2)
doxing for political purposes; and (3) the use of doxing by members of
anonymous online communities as a tool for internal regulation (i.e.,
“unmasking”). Understanding the different actors who use doxing, the
subjects who suffer the consequences of the publication of their personal
information, and the varying motivations underpinning the use of doxing
helps to narrow the search for an effective remedy.
1. Punching Down: Doxing “for the Lulz,” or Worse
When an actor publishes a subject’s personal information for purely
malicious reasons, such as revenge, harassment, stalking, or “for the lulz”
(meaning “laughter at the expense or the misfortune of others”40), the actor
is engaging in punching down doxing. The public, viral, and instant nature
35. See id.
36. Monica Anderson & Andrew Perrin, 13% of Americans Don’t Use the Internet.
Who Are They?, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 7, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2016/09/07/some-americans-dont-use-the-internet-who-are-they/ [https://perma.cc/WP
5B-LLWW].
37. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
38. Schneier, supra note 21.
39. See, e.g., Enzweiler, supra note 20, at 2001; Patricia R. Recupero, New
Technologies, New Problems, New Laws, 44 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY & L. 322, 325
(2016).
40. COLEMAN, supra note 25, at 31. “The lulz show how easily and casually trolls can
upend our sense of security by invading private spaces and exposing confidential
information. . . . [A]ny information thought to be personal, secure, or sacred is a prime
target for sharing or defilement . . . .” Id. at 32–33.
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of the Internet makes doxing an effective tool for harassing individuals for
purely malicious purposes; it allows the actor to injure the subject on a
much larger scale than in-person harassment. However, most people do not
see doxing as a serious problem, because names and phone numbers are
available in public phone directories.41 Even so, huge differences in scale
and accessibility exist between information “buried in small font in a dense
book of which only a few thousand copies exist in a relatively small
geographic location” and information released online that anyone anywhere
in the world can access.42
For example, Cecilia Barnes’s ex-boyfriend engaged in punching down
doxing, among other forms of cyberharassment, against Barnes after she
ended their long-term relationship.43 He created a Yahoo! profile using her
name that included sexual solicitations and nude photographs taken without
her knowledge or permission.44 In terms of doxing, Barnes’s ex-boyfriend
posted her personal and work telephone numbers, her home address, and
her email address.45 He solicited sex in Yahoo! chat rooms, impersonating
her “and then directing the attention of male chat room goers to the indecent
profiles he had posted of her.”46 Because her ex-boyfriend had doxed her
by posting her personal information, Barnes began receiving harassing
emails and phone calls, and random men attempted “to make personal visits
to her [home] with the false expectation that Barnes would act upon the
online sexual advances propagated by her ex-boyfriend.”47
Barnes sued Yahoo! for negligently failing to remove the unauthorized
profile after she tried to have the company take down the offensive
material.48 However, because the Communications Decency Act shields
Internet service providers from liability, the case was dismissed.49
Revenge porn and other sexual material is offensive, humiliating, and can
cause reputational damage. Further, the actual dox of Barnes’s name and
contact information is harassment that put her in physical danger and
provoked fear for her safety. Barnes’s ex-boyfriend had posted her personal
contact information for the “specific purpose of committing a ‘dangerous,
cruel, and highly indecent’ attempt at revenge,” and such conduct ultimately
resulted in significant harm to Barnes.50 And yet, Barnes lacked any
remedy for such conduct because the law fails to criminalize punching
down doxing.

41. Katherine Cross, “Things Have Happened in the Past Week”: On Doxing, Swatting,
and 8Chan, FEMINISTING (Jan. 16, 2015), http://feministing.com/2015/01/16/things-havehappened-in-the-past-week-on-doxing-swatting-and-8chan/ [https://perma.cc/VWP5-TC7L].
42. Id.
43. See Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1098 (9th Cir. 2009).
44. Id.
45. Kimberly Quon, Implementing a Standard of Care to Provide Protection from a
Lawless Internet, 31 WHITTIER L. REV. 589, 592 (2010).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Barnes, 570 F.3d at 1099.
49. Id. at 1105–06.
50. Quon, supra note 45, at 589.
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Another example of punching down doxing is the “#gamergate”
campaign of harassment (“Gamergate”) that targeted women with threats of
death and rape, general abuse, and the release of names, cell phone
numbers, addresses, usernames, and parental information.51 The actors
worked together under the adopted moniker “Gamergate” and executed a
“weekslong campaign to discredit or intimidate outspoken critics of the
male-dominated gaming industry and its culture.”52 The subjects of
Gamergate harassment, like Brianna Wu,53 endured a constant barrage of
harassment that affected their ability to work, socialize, and sleep.54 Writer
and developer Zoe Quinn fled her home after people online made rape and
death threats toward her and bragged about putting dead animals through
her mailbox.55 Feminist cultural critic Anita Sarkeesian canceled a talk at
Utah State University after the university administration received an email
that a shooting massacre would be carried out at the event.56 One important
factor unites the stories of Barnes, Wu, Quinn, and Sarkeesian: the actors
doxed them with the intent to intimidate, harass, silence, and threaten them.
These stories exemplify punching down doxing, and this Note seeks legal
relief for these subjects.57

51. A_Man_in_Black,
A
#gamergate
Harassment
Sampler,
STORIFY,
https://storify.com/a_man_in_black/gamergate-harassment (last visited Mar. 25, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/Y5J8-LKF7].
52. Nick Wingfield, Feminist Critics of Video Games Facing Threats in “Gamergate”
Campaign, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2014), http://nyti.ms/1quzTvM [https://perma.cc/93GACWSA].
53. See supra notes 1–10 and accompanying text. The tweets targeting Wu read: (1)
“Guess what bitch? I now know where you live. You and Frank live at [home address
redacted]”; (2) “I’ve got a K-Bar [knife used by U.S. Marines] and I’m coming to your
house so I can shove it up your ugly feminist cunt”; (3) “I’m going to rape your filthy ass
until you bleed, then choke you to death with your husband’s tiny Asian penis”; (4) “How’s
that for terrifying you stuck up cunt? I’m sick of you fucking feminist asshats”; (5) “Your
mutilated corpse will be on the front page of Jezebel tomorrow and there isn’t jack shit you
can do about it”; (6) “If you have any kids, they’re going to die too. I don’t give a fuck.
They’ll grow up to be feminists anyway”; (7) “I hope you enjoy your last moments alive on
this earth. You did nothing worthwhile with your life”; and (8) “You just made a shitty
game nobody liked. That’s it. Nobody [will care] when you die.” Wu, supra note 2.
54. A_Man_in_Black, supra note 51.
55. Keith Stuart, Zoe Quinn: “All Gamergate Has Done Is Ruin People’s Lives,”
GUARDIAN (Dec. 3, 2014, 9:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2014/
dec/03/zoe-quinn-gamergate-interview [https://perma.cc/GF65-RXL6].
56. Wingfield, supra note 52.
57. Cyberharassment disproportionately affects women and minority populations. See
CITRON, supra note 16, at 13 (“Of the 3,393 individuals reporting cyber harassment to
[advocacy group Working to Halt Online Abuse] from 2000 to 2011, 72.5 percent were
female.”); see also id. at 11 (arguing that young people, people of color, and lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgender, and queer (LGBTQ) people are more likely to experience severe
emotional distress from cyberharassment). Statistics from suicide prevention organizations
indicate that suicide rates by victims of online harassment are higher for minority
populations. Id. (information on suicide statistics); id. at 80 (domestic violence history); id.
at 102 (stalking).
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2. Doxing for Political Purposes
This Note focuses on instances in which doxing is used for purely
malicious purposes, as discussed in Part I.B.1; however, doxing is also used
for political purposes. That is, some actors use doxing as a tool to increase
transparency, expose what they perceive as injustice, or bring to light
newsworthy information in the public interest. The subjects of this
category of doxing might include multinational corporations, the U.S.
military, Donald Trump, or racist police officers.
For example, in early 2010, Chelsea Manning doxed the U.S. military by
releasing hundreds of thousands of sensitive military and diplomatic
documents to WikiLeaks.58 Manning dropped the dox because she “felt
that the Iraq and Afghanistan ‘war diaries’ . . . were vital to the public’s
understanding of the two interconnected counter-insurgency conflicts.”59
The dox “provide[d] ‘visual evidence of the gross abuse of state and
military power.’”60 Thus, Manning doxed for political purposes—rather
than for purely malicious reasons.
Another well-known instance of doxing for political purposes occurred
when the New York Times published an excerpt from then-presidential
candidate Donald Trump’s 1995 tax returns to show that “he had taken a
huge [financial] loss in 1995 that could have allowed him to avoid paying
federal income taxes for nearly two decades.”61 The New York Times
dropped the dox for political purposes, stating that it was in the public
interest because Trump “ha[d] broken with decades-long tradition and
refused to make his returns public” during a presidential campaign.62
In addition, chapters of the Black Lives Matter network used doxing to
expose police officers who purportedly used police brutality or racist
tactics.63 In these cases, the actors doxed to help protect other activists and

58. Chelsea E. Manning, The Years Since I Was Jailed for Releasing the “War Diaries”
Have Been a Rollercoaster, GUARDIAN (May 27, 2015, 10:43 AM), https://
www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/may/27/anniversary-chelsea-manning-arrestwar-diaries [https://perma.cc/79ZZ-3JY4].
59. Id. Manning was convicted of the leak in 2010, and President Barack Obama
commuted her sentence in January 2017. Charlie Savage, Chelsea Manning to Be Released
Early as Obama Commutes Sentence, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 17, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2k1jene
[https://perma.cc/A6LC-4ZVT].
60. COLEMAN, supra note 25, at 83 (quoting Christian Christensen, Collateral Murder
and the After-Life of Activist Imagery, MEDIUM (Apr. 14, 2014), https://medium.com/
@ChrChristensen/collateral-murder-and-the-after-life-of-activist-imagery-3fc2accd82bb#.70
lzgt8mt [https://perma.cc/M6ZJ-ZLTU].
61. Susanne Craig, The Time I Found Donald Trump’s Tax Records in My Mailbox,
N.Y. TIMES: TIMES INSIDER (Oct. 2, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/03/insider/thetime-i-found-donald-trumps-tax-records-in-my-mailbox.html
[https://perma.cc/2RGQ-2P
SE].
62. Id.
63. See J. Patrick Coolican, Minneapolis City Council Member Alondra Cano Under
Fire for Posting Phone Numbers, E-mail Addresses of Constituents, STAR TRIB. (Dec. 24,
2015, 12:34 PM), http://www.startribune.com/minneapolis-city-council-member-alondracano-under-fire-for-posting-phone-numbers-email-addresses-of-constituents/363470421/
[https://perma.cc/B3F6-LVLZ].
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draw attention to corruption and civil rights abuses within law
enforcement.64
The law has engaged in efforts to criminalize doxing when it is used for
political purposes, but it has failed to criminalize doxing when used solely
for malicious purposes (i.e., punching down doxing). In fact, some of the
strongest antidoxing regulations protect public figures, while private
citizens like Brianna Wu are left without effective remedies.65 For
example, Texas has taken legislative action to make it easier to prosecute
people who dox police officers.66 In addition, federal law applies to doxing
incidents that result in economic harm to businesses, such as Internet
activist Aaron Swartz’s dox of academic articles from the subscription
service JSTOR for the purpose of making academic information freely
available.67
The reason for such different protections under the law is confusing,
especially because government transparency is an important principle that
some scholars consider equal to individual privacy.68 Indeed, corporations,
government entities, and public figures have a lesser privacy interest than
individuals.69
3. Internal Regulation: Unmasking Troublemakers
Doxing is also used for “internal regulation” or “self-regulation.”70
Hackers use this doxing category to expose (or “to unmask”) the identity of
fellow hackers who, for one reason or another, have fallen out of favor with
their peers.71
For example, members of Anonymous (“Anons”), involved in a
campaign against Scientology, doxed fellow Anon, darr, when she
“attempt[ed] to push through an unpopular proposal” by “railroad[ing]” the
rest of the group.72 In addition, hackers doxed LulzSec leader-turned-FBIinformant Sabu in an attempt to reveal his identity to the authorities so that
64. Id.
65. See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.15(d)(1) (West 2015) (creating a rebuttable
presumption that a person is interfering with a peace officer if she intentionally disseminates
the home address, home telephone number, or social security number of the officer or a
family member of the officer).
66. Id.
67. See John Schwartz, Internet Activist, a Creator of RSS, Is Dead at 26, Apparently a
Suicide, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 12, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/13/technology/aaronswartz-internet-activist-dies-at-26.html (describing the life and death of tech pioneer Aaron
Swartz, who faced thirty-five years in prison and $1 million in fines for violating federal law
in an effort to make JSTOR articles freely accessible) [https://perma.cc/KZ52-H4TB].
68. See Martin E. Halstuk et al., Tipping the Scales: How the U.S. Supreme Court
Eviscerated Freedom of Information in Favor of Privacy, in TRANSPARENCY 2.0: DIGITAL
DATA AND PRIVACY IN A WIRED WORLD 17, 19–20 (David Cuillier & Charles N. Davis eds.,
2014).
69. See generally Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46 (1988); N.Y. Times
Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Quin S. Landon, The First Amendment and SpeechBased Torts: Recalibrating the Balance, 66 U. MIAMI L. REV. 157 (2011).
70. See COLEMAN, supra note 25, at 73.
71. See id.
72. Id.
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he would be prosecuted.73 This type of doxing falls in a gray area between
doxing for malicious purposes and doxing for political purposes. While this
Note’s search for a remedy focuses specifically on punching down doxing,
unmasking helps to differentiate the kinds of intent that can underlie an
actor’s use of doxing.
C. Doctrinal Background
This section discusses two relevant doctrines underlying, influencing,
and limiting the possible remedies for punching down doxing: (1) the right
to privacy and (2) the First Amendment right to freedom of speech.
1. Right to Privacy
The act of doxing implicates, by necessity, the subject’s right to privacy.
Privacy is treasured in the United States. In his dissent in Olmstead v.
United States,74 Justice Louis Brandeis noted that “the right to be let alone
[is] the most comprehensive of rights and the right most valued by civilized
[people].”75
As technology changes, so do notions of privacy. Historically, privacy
cases have asserted two constitutional values: “the individual interest in
avoiding disclosure of personal matters” and “the interest in independence
in making certain kinds of important decisions.”76 Thus, doxing is uniquely
harmful to the right of privacy because “there is no frontier where [one]
may go to get a new start. . . . All of our important acts, our setbacks, the
accusations made against us go into data banks and are instantly
retrievable.”77 Today, our data move about ceaselessly, so “the right to
control the way others use the information concerning us” increases in
importance as prevailing historical notions of privacy evolve.78
However, the right to privacy is not absolute and often runs against
freedom of speech and freedom of information.79 This conflict comes into
play when actors dox publicly available information such as home
addresses. The interaction of privacy and access to information is not
73. Derek Mead, Sabu Has Been an FBI Informant for Months, MOTHERBOARD BLOG
(Mar. 6, 2012, 10:26 AM), http://motherboard.vice.com/read/months-before-his-arrest-sabuwas-railing-against-doxing-while-snitching-to-the-feds (“Doxing, in the world of modern
hacking, is more or less a guaranteed jail sentence.”) [https://perma.cc/547Y-3BFG]. Sabu’s
cooperation resulted in the prosecution of several other Anons. See COLEMAN, supra note 25,
at 391.
74. 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
75. Id. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
76. U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749,
762 (1989) (quoting Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598–600 (1977)).
77. Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 96 (1974). Although he was discussing computer
data storage more generally, Justice William H. Rehnquist’s words ring true when applied to
the Internet. See id.
78. Norberto Nuno Gomes de Andrade, The Right to Privacy and the Right to Identity in
the Age of Ubiquitous Computing, in PERSONAL DATA PRIVACY AND PROTECTION IN A
SURVEILLANCE ERA: TECHNOLOGIES AND PRACTICES 19, 22–23 (Christina Akrivopoulou &
Athanasios Psygkas eds., 2010).
79. See Halstuk et al., supra note 68, at 19–20.

2017]

THE DOXING DILEMMA

2463

simply “a negotiation between the doctrinal principles of each body of law:
the presumption of openness that forms the basis of access law versus the
expectation of privacy giving rise to informational privacy.”80
2. The First Amendment
Any approach to providing a legal remedy for doxing victims must
comport with the First Amendment. Actors commonly defend themselves
by claiming that “they are only exercising their First Amendment right to
free speech. And in many cases, an examination of their speech could lead
[courts] to concur.”81 Challengers to statutory solutions for doxing could
raise two primary arguments: (1) that a statute is void for vagueness and
(2) that a statute is overbroad by punishing protected speech.82
The First Amendment rests on the underlying principle that “the
government may not prohibit the expression of an idea simply because
society finds the idea itself offensive or disagreeable.”83 In addition to
protecting spoken and written communication, the First Amendment
protects “expressive conduct so long as that conduct ‘convey[s] a
particularized message’ and is likely to be understood in the surrounding
circumstances.”84 However, “the [First] Amendment has no application
when what is restricted is not protected speech.”85 This subsection explores
protected speech and exceptions to First Amendment doctrine that remove
certain categories of speech and expressive conduct from constitutional
protection.
a. Background
The First Amendment broadly protects communication. “[S]o long as the
means are peaceful, the communication need not meet standards of
acceptability.”86 Notions of “acceptability” encompass speech that is
80. Charles N. Davis & David Cuillier, Introduction to TRANSPARENCY 2.0: DIGITAL
DATA AND PRIVACY IN A WIRED WORLD, supra note 68, at vii, vii.
81. Michael J. Prout, Assistant Dir. for Judicial Sec., U.S. Marshals Serv., Written
Statement Presented to the United States Sentencing Commission Public Hearing on the
Court Security Improvement Act of 2007 (Mar. 17, 2009), http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/
files/pdf/amendment-process/public-hearings-and-meetings/20090317/Prout_testimony.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6E55-2H4T].
82. Leong & Morando, supra note 34, at 132.
83. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 414 (1989) (collecting cases); see also Hustler
Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 55 (1988) (rejecting an outrageousness standard for
speech because it “runs afoul of our longstanding refusal to allow damages to be awarded
because the speech in question may have an adverse emotional impact on the audience”);
Members of the City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984); Bolger v.
Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 65, 72 (1983); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 462–
463 (1980); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745–46 (1978) (“[I]t is a central tenet of
the First Amendment that the government must remain neutral in the marketplace of ideas.”);
Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 63–65, 67–68 (1976).
84. Kaahumanu v. Hawaii, 682 F.3d 789, 798 (9th Cir. 2012) (quoting Spence v.
Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 409–11 (1974) (per curiam)).
85. Nev. Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 564 U.S. 117, 121 (2011).
86. Org. for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971).
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vulgar, offensive, and disagreeable.87 For example, “[s]exual expression
which is indecent but not obscene is protected by the First Amendment.”88
Of course, broadly protecting vulgar and indecent speech may, to some,
create a world filled with “verbal tumult, discord, and even offensive
utterance.”89 But this characterization represents a “necessary side effect[]
of the broader enduring values which the process of open debate permits us
to achieve. That the air may at times seem filled with verbal cacophony is,
in this sense not a sign of weakness but of strength.”90
These broad protections are essential to prevent “empower[ing] a
majority to silence dissidents simply as a matter of personal
predilections.”91 Moreover, “the fact that society may find speech
offensive is not a sufficient reason for suppressing it. If it is the speaker’s
opinion that gives offense, that consequence is a reason for according it
constitutional protection.”92 In addition, First Amendment protection
extends beyond traditional speech to encompass expressive conduct93 and
speech via the Internet.94
b. The “True Threat” Exception
The First Amendment is not an absolute bar to regulating speech.
Certain categories of expression are either “not within the area of
constitutionally protected speech”95 or the “protection of the First
Amendment does not extend” to them.96 The question is whether certain
types of harmful speech, such as doxing, can be proscribed without running
afoul of the First Amendment.97 In Cohen v. California,98 the Supreme
Court held that the ability to regulate speech depends on a showing that
“substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable
manner.”99

87. Id.
88. Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (finding that
prohibiting obscene telephone messages was constitutional and that the denial of adult access
to telephone messages that were indecent but not obscene far exceeded that which was
necessary to limit access of minors to such messages and did not survive constitutional
scrutiny).
89. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24–25 (1971).
90. Id. at 25.
91. Id. at 21 (reversing a state disturbing the peace conviction for a man who wore a
jacket in court that said “fuck the draft”).
92. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978).
93. See, e.g., Cohen, 403 U.S. at 18.
94. See, e.g., Doe v. 2TheMart.com Inc., 140 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1091–93 (W.D. Wash.
2001).
95. R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (quoting Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 483 (1957)).
96. Id. at 383 (quoting Sable Commc’ns of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 124 (1989);
Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 504 (1984)).
97. See Ronald Turner, On Free, Harmful, and Hateful Speech, 82 TENN. L. REV. 283,
285 (2015) (discussing the interaction between harmful speech and the First Amendment).
98. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
99. Id. at 21.
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The First Amendment does not protect speech or writing that is as an
integral part of criminal conduct.100 The exception most relevant to this
Note’s effort to find a remedy for doxing is the “true threat” exception.
True threats are not constitutionally protected by the First
Amendment.101 They encompass statements in which the speaker means to
communicate a serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful
violence against a particular individual or group of individuals.102 The true
threat exception is exemplified by the idea that, “while advocating for
violence is considered protected speech, threatening a particular individual
with violence is not.”103 However, statements that amount to political
hyperbole do not constitute true threats.104
Actual intent to carry out the threat is not required for a communication
to constitute a true threat.105 Rather, a prohibition on true threats
“protect[s] individuals from the fear of violence” and “from the disruption
that fear engenders,” in addition to protecting people “from the possibility
that the threatened violence will occur.”106 True threats can also include
intimidation, when “a speaker directs a threat to a person or group of
persons with the intent of placing the victim in fear of bodily harm or
death.”107 Importantly, the true threat exception extends to true threats that
are posted on a website108 or communicated over email.109
In deciding whether speech constitutes a true threat and is thus
unprotected by the First Amendment, courts consider the totality of the
circumstances, whether the threat is conditional, and the reaction of the
listeners.110
100. Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 498 (1949); see also
Commonwealth v. Johnson, 21 N.E.3d 937, 946–47 (Mass. 2014) (“The defendants point to
no lawful purpose of their ‘communications’ that would take them outside of the exception
delineated in Giboney.”).
101. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359–60 (2003).
102. See id.; R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992).
103. Marie-Helen Maras, Unprotected Speech Communicated Via Social Media: What
Amounts to a True Threat?, 19 J. INTERNET L. 3, 3 (2015).
104. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707–08 (1960) (finding that to convict for
threatening the President’s life, the government must first prove a true threat that is not
political hyperbole).
105. R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 383.
106. Id. at 408.
107. Black, 538 U.S. at 360.
108. See United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 960–61 (9th Cir. 2007); D.C. v. R.R.,
106 Cal. Rptr. 3d 399, 421–22 (Ct. App. 2010); see also Novartis Vaccines & Diagnostics,
Inc. v. Stop Huntingdon Animal Cruelty USA, Inc., 50 Cal. Rptr. 3d 27, 39 (Ct. App. 2006)
(finding that a website maintained by an organization opposed to animal testing was not
protected under the First Amendment when the website contained information about a
biopharmaceutical company’s employees, including home addresses, and made
particularized threats of arson against the employees).
109. Abbott v. Maryland, 989 A.2d 795, 826 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2010) (finding that an
instruction distinguishing a true threat from constitutionally protected speech must be given
in a case involving a threat sent by email).
110. United States v. Fullmer, 584 F.3d 132, 154 (3d Cir. 2009). The court found that
news posts on an animal rights organization’s website fell within First Amendment
protection, while posts that “disseminate the personal information of individuals employed
by [the animal testers]” are “more problematic” and concluded that electronic
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For example, in Elonis v. United States,111 the Supreme Court held that
sole reliance on an objective intent standard in assessing true threats would
not suffice.112 In interpreting a federal statute prohibiting threatening
interstate communications that lacked a mens rea requirement, the Court
noted that the mens rea element would be “satisfied if the defendant
transmit[ted] a communication for the purpose of issuing a threat or with
knowledge that the communication [would] be viewed as a threat.”113 The
Court, however, did not decide whether a reckless mens rea would
suffice.114
II. CURRENT APPROACHES TO PROVIDING A REMEDY
FOR DOXING ARE INSUFFICIENT
Despite the incredible injuries malicious doxing causes, few legal
remedies for subjects exist.115 This part evaluates whether current federal
and state statutory and common law schemes that regulate other forms of
doxing and cyberharassment can remedy punching down doxing. Part II.A
discusses three current federal statutes and one proposed statute applicable
to malicious doxing, and it analyzes the shortcomings of each. Part II.B
focuses on state criminal and common law approaches that capture some
instances of cyberharassment and explains their ineffectiveness as applied
to doxing.
A. Federal Statutory Approaches and Their Limitations
This section discusses three federal statutes relevant to a search for a
remedy for malicious doxing: (1) section 230 of the Communications

communications encouraging or describing an illegal act at a specific time, in combination
with the other materials, constitute a true threat (in this case, going to burn down an animal
tester’s house at a certain time). Id. at 155l; see also Torres v. Clark, No. 1:CV-10-1323,
2012 WL 4484915, at *9 (M.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2012), aff’d, 522 F. App’x 103 (3d Cir. 2013).
In Torres, the court found a true threat when a prisoner wrote that if a corrections officer
“keep[s] acting like he is above policy/law somebody is going to break his jaw is what I
assume?!” when he knew that the officer was reading his mail. Id. at *3. The prison’s
dangerous environment meant that threats of violence against corrections officers must be
taken seriously. Id. at *9. For more on conditional threats constituting true threats, see
United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 554 n.8 (3d Cir. 1991).
111. 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015).
112. See Maras, supra note 103, at 7.
113. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2004 (2015) (emphasis added). On remand,
the Third Circuit upheld Elonis’s conviction on the grounds that that the trial court’s error
(instructing the jury that the negligence standard was sufficient to convict) was harmless.
United States v. Elonis, 841 F.3d 589, 601 (3d Cir. 2016). In addition, Elonis’s “testimony
at trial focused on [the] purpose of his Facebook posts, but never contested that he knew his
posts would be viewed as threats.” Id. at 599. Thus, a jury could have found that Elonis
knew the “threatening nature” of his posts, even if the jury believed his testimony. Id.
114. See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2004.
115. See ALICE E. MARWICK & ROSS MILLER, FORDHAM CTR. ON LAW & INFO. POLICY,
ONLINE HARASSMENT, DEFAMATION, AND HATEFUL SPEECH: A PRIMER OF THE LEGAL
LANDSCAPE 5–6 (2014), http://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1002&
context=clip [https://perma.cc/2ZGG-VNTC].
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Decency Act116 (CDA), (2) the Interstate Communications Statute,117 and
(3) the Interstate Stalking statute.118 This section also examines a current
bill. Further, this section addresses the weaknesses of each federal approach
and explains why none suffices to create an appropriate remedy for doxing.
1. The Communications Decency Act
Part 2.A.1.a provides an overview of the CDA, explaining the protections
it affords to online service providers by shielding them from liability. Part
2.A.2.b then discusses the statute’s limitations as applied to doxing.
a. Overview of the Statute
The CDA applies to malicious doxing by creating a liability shield for
online services and thus removing a potential pathway to a doxing remedy.
The CDA regulates obscene content on the Internet such as child
pornography and other indecent content accessible to children.119
However, section 230 of the CDA provides that no “provider or user of an
interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of
any information provided by another information content provider.”120
Interactive computer service providers include, among other things, search
engines,121 social media networks,122 hosts of online business reviews,123
online vendors,124 and operators of sites that have message boards.125
The CDA’s “Good Samaritan” provision limits liability for these online
services by separating the services (e.g., Twitter) from individual speakers
or posters who use them (e.g., Twitter users). Using the Gamergate
example discussed in Part I.B.1, Twitter could not be held liable under the
CDA for a Twitter user harassing and doxing Brianna Wu.
In addition to limiting liability for hosting constitutionally protected but
“obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or
otherwise objectionable” material,126 the CDA also limits liability for
speech that is not constitutionally protected.127 Accordingly, the CDA
operates as a liability shield, eliminating the possibility of a remedy by
116. 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2012).
117. 18 U.S.C. § 875.
118. Id. § 2261A.
119. 47 U.S.C. § 223(a).
120. Id. § 230(c)(1).
121. Stayart v. Yahoo! Inc., 651 F. Supp. 2d 873, 873 (E.D. Wis. 2009).
122. Caraccioli v. Facebook, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 3d 1056, 1066 (N.D. Cal. 2016).
123. Kimzey v. Yelp Inc., No. C13-1734RAJ, 2014 WL 1805551 (W.D. Wash. May 7,
2014).
124. Joseph v. Amazon.com, Inc., 46 F. Supp. 3d 1095, 1105–07 (W.D. Wash. 2014).
125. DiMeo v. Max, 248 F. App’x 280, 282 (3d Cir. 2007).
126. 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A) (2012).
127. See, e.g., GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.3d 752 (Tex. App. 2014) (finding
that the purportedly unconstitutional nature of revenge porn images posted to websites
without the consent of the subjects did not affect the court’s determination of whether the
interactive computer service provider that hosted the websites was entitled to immunity
under the CDA).
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limiting the liability of Internet service providers that host doxed content,
regardless of whether that content is constitutionally protected.
The CDA has two parallel goals: (1) “to promote the free exchange of
information and ideas over the Internet” and (2) “to encourage voluntary
monitoring for offensive or obscene material.”128 These goals, together
with the protections provided by the CDA, have caused online civil liberties
advocates to hail the Act as “the most important law protecting internet
speech.”129
The Good Samaritan provision was also “added to the CDA as part of the
CDA’s overall goal to ‘clean up’ the Internet from obscene materials,” and
it limits liability for online services to “enable filtering or blocking . . . to
spur the advancement of content filtering technologies.”130 An early
decision addressing the provision found that an “important purpose of § 230
was to encourage service providers to self-regulate the dissemination of
offensive material over their services,” thereby minimizing the necessity of
state regulation of Internet speech.131
b. Limitations of the Statute as Applied to Doxing
Because of section 230, applying the CDA to punching down doxing
would shield an entire class of possible defendants—service providers—
from liability for doxing. In applying the CDA, “[c]ourts have roundly
immunized site operators from liability even though they knew or should
have known that user-generated content contained defamation, privacy
invasions, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and civil rights
violations.”132 The immunity provides “little incentive for [services] to
self-regulate the appropriateness of the content posted there, leaving sites as
blank canvases readily available for the actual parties to directly furnish
inappropriate material online.”133
For example, in Chicago Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights Under
Law, Inc. v. Craigslist, Inc.,134 the Seventh Circuit found Craigslist immune
from liability under the CDA for users’ discriminatory housing
advertisements, which violated the Fair Housing Act.135 Thus, the CDA

128. Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d 1096, 1099–100 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Carafano
v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1122 (9th Cir. 2003)).
129. CDA 230: The Most Important Law Protecting Internet Speech, ELECTRONIC
FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/issues/cda230 (last visited Mar. 25, 2017)
[https://perma.cc/4RCR-TXAX].
130. Arthur Chu, Mr. Obama, Tear Down This Liability Shield, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 29,
2015), https://techcrunch.com/2015/09/29/mr-obama-tear-down-this-liability-shield/ [https://
perma.cc/KD8M-VT7L].
131. Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997).
132. CITRON, supra note 16, at 171.
133. Quon, supra note 45, at 590.
134. 519 F.3d 666 (7th Cir. 2008).
135. Id. at 670.
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limits the remedies available to doxing subjects and leaves them without
redress for their injuries.136
Scholars have proposed various amendments to the CDA.137 One
proposal calls for a take-down provision that “would work much like the
safe harbor under section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(‘DMCA’), which protects [services] who inadvertently host materials that
infringe intellectual property rights.”138 This proposal would require that
services take down offensive content once they are notified—that content
could include doxes. Congress could assign the Federal Communications
Commission to create guidelines for companies to help determine which
types of communications should be taken down.139
Another proposal would remove the safe harbor provision for sites that
“encourage cyber stalking or nonconsensual pornography and make money
from its removal or that principally host cyber stalking or nonconsensual
pornography.”140 Yet another would create a unique cause of action for
injunctive relief available to subjects whose personal information is posted
online.141 In Spain, citizens can sue to have sensitive information
pertaining to them removed from the Internet under the Spanish Data
Protection Authority.142 This strategy could be applied to doxing.
However, this so-called “right to be forgotten” in the European Union
applies only when information is “inaccurate, inadequate, irrelevant, or
excessive,” and the right is balanced against fundamental rights like the
freedom of expression.143 Therefore, this carve out, if included, might not
capture doxing after all. In addition, an amendment to section 230’s safe
harbor provision would need to cover actions outside of defamation, or else
doxing could not be addressed.
2. The Interstate Communications Statute
Part II.A.2.a. provides an overview of the Interstate Communications
Statute, 18 U.S.C. § 875. Part II.A.2.b discusses limitations of the statute as
applied to doxing and provides reasons why it fails to serve as an effective
solution.
136. See Alison Virginia King, Constitutionality of Cyberbullying Laws: Keeping the
Online Playground Safe for Both Teens and Free Speech, 63 VAND. L. REV. 845, 878 (2010).
137. See, e.g., JOEL REIDENBERG ET AL., FORDHAM CTR. ON LAW & INFO. POLICY, SECTION
230 OF THE COMMUNICATIONS DECENCY ACT: A SURVEY OF THE LEGAL LITERATURE AND
REFORM PROPOSALS 47–52 (2012), https://www.fordham.edu/download/downloads/id/1825/
clip_section_230_of_the_communications_decency_act_report.pdf [https://perma.cc/TW4AHAFG].
138. See King, supra note 136, at 878 & n.209.
139. Id. at 878.
140. See CITRON, supra note 16, at 177.
141. Konstantinos K. Stylianou, Hasta La Vista Privacy, or How Technology Terminated
Privacy, in PERSONAL DATA PRIVACY AND PROTECTION IN A SURVEILLANCE ERA:
TECHNOLOGIES AND PRACTICES, supra note 78, at 44, 51.
142. Id.
143. EUROPEAN COMM’N, FACTSHEET ON THE “RIGHT TO BE FORGOTTEN” RULING (C131/12) (2014), http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/files/factsheets/factsheet_data_
protection_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/BJ6X-PVMB].
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a. Overview of the Statute
The Interstate Communications Statute—specifically § 875(c)—
criminalizes the Internet transmission144 of “any communication containing
any threat to kidnap any person or any threat to injure the person of
another.”145 Federal prosecutors could use § 875(c) to prosecute actors who
dox in combination with administering threats. Indeed, this statute could
apply to Gamergate actors who harassed, threatened, and doxed Wu and
others.
Under § 875(c), the threatened party need not actually receive the
threat.146 In addition, this statute does not require the threatener to have
actually intended to carry out the threat if “the threat on its face and in the
circumstances in which it is made is so unequivocal, unconditional,
immediate and specific as to the person threatened, as to convey a gravity of
purpose and imminent prospect of execution.”147 In Elonis, the Supreme
Court held that a purposeful or knowing mens rea is sufficient to establish
culpability under § 875(c); however, the Court left it to the lower courts to
determine whether recklessness would also suffice.148
b. Shortcomings of the Interstate Communications Statute
While § 875(c) comes close to covering some instances of doxing, it fails
to provide a completely effective solution for three reasons. First, the
actions the actor undertakes must constitute a threat to kidnap or injure the
subject.149 If the speech is a “true threat,” it falls under the true threat
exception to the First Amendment and thus can be regulated.150 In many
instances of doxing, an actor “may never convey an explicit threat to kidnap
or injure his or her victim, yet the victim could still have good reason to be
terrified.”151 Thus, it is unlikely that a dox will contain a specific, explicit
threat. However, courts’ interpretations of a similar statute can shed some
light on how § 875 could best be construed to capture malicious doxing,
even when it is not accompanied by an additional specific threat. For
144. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (2012). The statute’s language criminalizes interstate
transmission; however, proving Internet transmission alone is sufficient to prove
transmission through interstate commerce for the purposes of this statute. Id.
145. Id.
146. United States v. Kistler, 558 F. Supp. 2d 655, 656 n.2 (W.D. Va. 2008).
147. United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1976) (finding that no specific
intent is required when “the threat itself may affront such important social interests that it is
punishable absent proof of a specific intent to carry it into action”).
148. Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2004 (2015). On remand, the Third Circuit
did not reach whether recklessness specifically sufficed, but it held that “Section 875(c)
contains both a subjective and objective component, and the Government must satisfy both
in order to convict a defendant under the statute.” United States v. Elonis, 841 F.3d 589, 596,
601 (3d Cir. 2016).
149. See supra note 144 and accompanying text.
150. See Elonis, 135 S. Ct. at 2004; see also supra Part I.C.2.a.
151. Federal Criminal Statutes, U.N.C. CHAPEL HILL:
CYBERSTALKING, http://
cyberstalking.web.unc.edu/federal-criminal-statutes/ (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) [https://
perma.cc/8Y9T-9F69].

2017]

THE DOXING DILEMMA

2471

example, the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act (FACE)
criminalizes threats made to providers of reproductive health services.152 In
Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists,153 the Ninth
Circuit held that the doxing of the names and addresses of health providers
on “wanted”-style posters constituted a true threat without an additional,
specific threat of violence.154 The court found that the defendant “was
aware that a ‘wanted’-type poster would likely be interpreted as a serious
threat of death or bodily harm by a doctor in the reproductive health
services community who was identified on one, given the previous pattern
of ‘WANTED’ posters identifying a specific physician followed by that
physician’s murder.”155
Accordingly, one effective approach to doxing could be to find that a dox
of names and addresses online is a true threat without an additional, specific
threat of violence. However, the Planned Parenthood Court’s approach
required the homicide of another doctor to happen before finding a true
threat.156 This logic lends weight to Gamergate victim Zoe Quinn’s fears
“that what it’s going to take to stop [the doxing and harassment of victims
without a remedy] is the death of one of the women who’s been
targeted.”157
The second drawback of § 875(c) is the possibility that lower federal
courts will employ the Supreme Court’s “purposeful or knowing mens rea”
standard in Elonis to determine true threats under the statute without also
adopting the recklessness standard, making it harder to prosecute threats.158
The first standard—purposefulness—requires “a subjective intent to
threaten,” which is similar to regular criminal intent.159 Under the Model
Penal Code, this standard requires proof that a defendant “consciously
wants to cause a certain result.”160 “At trial, the prosecution would rely on
statements made by the defendant to cohorts, and assembling different
pieces of evidence, in order to convince the fact finder that the defendant
possessed specific intent” to threaten the subject.161
The second standard—knowledge—requires showing the defendant’s
knowledge that the communication would be viewed as a threat.162 The
152. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (2012). FACE creates a private right of action against anyone who
by “threat of force . . . intentionally . . . intimidates . . . any person because that person is or
has been . . . providing reproductive health services.” Id. § 248(a)(1); see id. § 248(c)(1)(A).
153. 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002).
154. Id. at 1063.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Stuart, supra note 55.
158. See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2004 (2015) (“Section 875(c)’s mental
state requirement is satisfied if the defendant transmits a communication for the purpose of
issuing a threat or with knowledge that the communication will be viewed as a threat. The
Court declines to address whether a mental state of recklessness would also suffice.”).
159. Jing Xun Quek, Elonis v. United States: The Next Twelve Years, 31 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1109, 1126 (2016).
160. See id. at 1116.
161. Id. at 1126.
162. See id.
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Model Penal Code’s definition of “knowingly” requires proof that a
defendant “is practically certain that his conduct will cause [the intended]
These higher standards could risk undercriminalizing
result.”163
threatening communications—a dangerous prospect when the nature of
social media exacerbates the dangers inherent in true threats.164
However, a recklessness standard would provide greater protection for
doxing subjects while still comporting with the true threat doctrine.165
Recklessness contemplates the subject’s objective interpretation of the
threat along with the subjective intent of the actor. This is critical because
the National Network to End Domestic Violence argues that “victims are
often the best assessors of the risk that the threats of violence they face will
be carried out.”166 The objective context of a message would help
prosecutors and law enforcement to understand the meaning and
implications of that message.167
The third issue with § 875(c) is that many law enforcement officers are
simply unaware that the statute exists and could be used to prosecute
doxing.168 In fact, one subject found that seeking legal recourse “only
continually put [her] in harm’s way.”169 For example, after she was doxed,
Brianna Wu called the police.170 The FBI assigned a special agent to her
case, which was then reassigned to the state attorney general’s office, which
has not yet pursued charges.171 Because of her high-profile case, Wu
believes that law enforcement “[has] every reason to want to solve this
crime, but at the same time nothing has happened, even giving them as
much information as [she] ha[s].”172 Wu and her husband explained to the
FBI agent that they “feel like [they] are sending emails into the void” and
that “[they] do not have any faith that the FBI is interested in helping [their]
family.”173 Accordingly, any adequate remedy for doxing will provide for
the training of law enforcement officers so that they can better help doxing
victims who are in danger.

163. Id. at 1116.
164. See id. at 1135; see also supra Part I.A.1.
165. See infra Part III.A.
166. Brief of Amici Curiae the National Network to End Domestic Violence et al. in
Support of Respondent at 19 n.34, Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001 (2015) (No. 13983); see also Leong & Morando, supra note 34.
167. Jessica K. Formichella, A Reckless Guessing Game: Online Threats Against Women
in the Aftermath of Elonis v. United States, 41 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. (forthcoming 2017).
168. Nick Visser, Woman Targeted in ‘GamerGate’ Harassment Drops Charges,
HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 11, 2016, 1:46 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/zoequinn-gamergate-charges_us_56bc1d13e4b0b40245c56102
[https://perma.cc/A79F-NG
XM].
169. Id.
170. Merlan, supra note 6.
171. Dewey, supra note 1.
172. Merlan, supra note 6.
173. Dewey, supra note 1.
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3. The Interstate Stalking Statute
Part II.A.3.a. provides an overview of the Interstate Stalking Statute, 18
U.S.C. § 2261A, including a brief discussion of its 2013 amendment. Part
II.A.3.b further discusses the limitations of the Interstate Stalking Statute as
applied to doxing and law enforcement’s unwillingness to enforce the
statute.
a. Overview of the Statute
Section 2261A(2) of the Interstate Stalking Statute prohibits the use of
“any interactive computer service” in a “course of conduct” that places a
person in reasonable fear of death or serious bodily injury or “causes
substantial emotional distress to a person.”174 Whether this statute could be
used to prosecute malicious doxing depends on whether the dox constitutes
a “course of conduct.” For example, to prosecute the Gamergate actor
under the statute in Brianna Wu’s case, the actor’s tweets must constitute a
“course of conduct.” The statute requires “intent to kill, injure, harass, or
place under surveillance with intent to kill, injure, harass, or intimidate
another person.”175
Congress enacted the statute in 1996 as part of the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA), primarily to combat in-person stalking resulting in
physical harm to victims.176 However, “[w]ith the proliferation of cheap
technology that allows instantaneous tracking and monitoring of victims,
the frequency of cyberstalking has risen dramatically.”177 Accordingly,
Congress amended VAWA in 2013 to include explicit provisions for
cyberstalking.178
A “course of conduct” is an element of any offense under § 2261A(2)
and means “a pattern of conduct composed of two or more acts.”179 In
2015, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware convicted three
defendants on charges of cyberstalking that resulted in a death.180 They
“conducted a campaign to surveil and harass” the victim, Christine Belford,
one of the defendants’ ex-wife.181 Over four years, the defendants “posted
accusations against the victim online, sent accusations against Belford to
the school that one of the children attended and to Belford’s church, and
174. 18 U.S.C. § 2261A(2)(A)–(B) (2012).
175. Id. § 2261A(2).
176. See Melvin Huang, Note, Keeping Stalkers at Bay in Texas, 15 TEX. J. ON C.L. &
C.R. 53, 59–60 (2009) (discussing the 1990s movement toward criminalizing stalking
following the murder of actress Rebecca Schaeffer by an obsessed fan who stalked her for
two years).
177. Id. at 56–57 (“[C]yberstalking has replaced traditional methods of stalking and
harassment.” (quoting U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STALKING AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: REPORT
TO CONGRESS 5 (2001)).
178. See STALKING RES. CTR., NAT’L CTR. FOR VICTIMS OF CRIME, SUMMARY OF CHANGES
FROM VAWA 2013 RELATED TO STALKING (2013), http://www.victimsofcrime.org/docs/src/
vawa-2013-and-stalking.pdf?sfvrsn=2 [https://perma.cc/WTS2-RBHW].
179. United States v. Bell, 303 F.3d 1187, 1192 (9th Cir. 2002).
180. See United States v. Matusiewicz, 165 F. Supp. 3d 166, 167 (D. Del. 2015).
181. Id.
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solicited their friends’ assistance in visiting Belford’s home to monitor
Belford.”182
This case is the first in which defendants “were convicted of
cyberstalking resulting in [a] death.”183 It also demonstrates the high bar
necessary to prove a “course of conduct” under the statute.
b. Limitations to the Statute’s Application to Doxing
The Interstate Stalking Statute could be an effective tool to combat some
instances of doxing, but it is underinclusive because of its “course of
conduct” requirement. Additionally, this statute faces the same resource
limitation problems as the Interstate Communications Statute.
Section 2261A(2) applies where an actor uses a computer within a
“course of conduct” that places a person in reasonable fear of death or
serious bodily harm or “causes, attempts to cause, or would be reasonably
expected to cause substantial emotional distress to a person.”184
Limitations to this statute’s application to doxing exist because actors often
work in concert with other actors in a cybermob.185 Countless threads work
together with “one poster starting the abuse and others piling on.”186 If
each actor “was responsible for only one or two isolated posts,” no single
person could likely be held responsible for the “course of conduct” under
§ 2261A(2).187
According to Professor Danielle Keats Citron, the Interstate Stalking
Statute is “very helpful” when federal law enforcement agencies enforce
it.188 However, she argues that officers often say, “We’re in the business of
worrying about murder and terrorism, we don’t enforce cyberstalking
laws.”189 Meanwhile, officers spend the majority of their time and
resources investigating drug crimes and larceny, so it is untrue that federal
law enforcement is too busy investigating terrorism and murder—“[t]he
statistics belie that.”190 Indeed, federal prosecutors seldom apply the statute
to cyberharassment cases.191 Whereas prosecutors used § 2261A ten times

182. Id. It is unclear whether any of the defendants actually doxed Belford, but the
opinion indicates that the defendants encouraged others to harass her at her home. Id.
183. Press Release, U.S. Att’y’s Office, D. Del., Three Family Members Receive
Life Sentences for Courthouse Murder Conspiracy (Feb. 19, 2016), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/three-family-members-receive-life-sentences-courthouse-murder-conspiracy [https://
perma.cc/JL2H-PL6M].
184. See supra Part II.A.3.
185. See CITRON, supra note 16, at 136.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 136–37.
188. Merlan, supra note 6.
189. Id.
190. Id.
191. See CITRON, supra note 16, at 85.
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from 2010 to 2013,192 an estimated 3.3 million people age eighteen or older
were victims of stalking in a single year.193
4. Proposed Legislation
U.S. Representative Katherine Clark, who represents the district where
Brianna Wu and other doxing subjects live, has proposed several pieces of
legislation that would provide some relief to doxing victims. In June 2015,
Representative Clark proposed the Prioritizing Online Threat Enforcement
Act of 2015, which calls upon the U.S. Attorney General to ensure that at
least ten additional FBI agents support the Criminal Division of the
Department of Justice in the investigation and coordination of cybercrimes
against individuals.194 In March 2016, Representative Clark introduced the
Cybercrime Enforcement Training Assistance Act of 2016, directing the
Department of Justice to award grants to state and local governments to
prevent, enforce, and prosecute cybercrimes against individuals.195
Both bills would provide important support to doxing subjects. The first
would address some of the systematic bars to prosecution under federal
statutes by assigning more officers to investigate cybercrimes. The second
would alleviate some of the concerns addressed in Part II.B by making
officers aware of doxing by increasing training at the state and local
level.196
The House of Representatives referred the Cybercrime Enforcement
Training Assistance Act to the House Committee on the Judiciary and then
to the Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, Homeland Security, and
Investigations.197
The Prioritizing Online Threat Enforcement Act
followed the same path to committee as its successor.198 It does not have
any Republican supporters and is not expected to make it past the
subcommittee stage.199
B. State Approaches and Their Limitations
This section discusses different ways state legislatures have addressed
cyberharassment and how, if at all, these approaches reach doxing. Part

192. See id. (finding only ten instances of prosecutorial use of § 2261A from 2010 to
2013).
193. See SHANNAN CATALANO, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, STALKING VICTIMS IN THE
UNITED STATES—REVISED (2012), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/svus_rev.pdf
[https://perma.cc/2444-MF26].
194. H.R. 2602, 114th Cong. (2016).
195. H.R. 4740, 114th Cong. (2016).
196. See discussion infra Part II.B.
197. All Actions: H.R. 4740—Cybercrime Enforcement Training Assistance Act of 2016,
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/4740/all-actions
(last visited Mar. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/N4G8-ZVVE].
198. All Actions: H.R. 2602—Prioritizing Online Threat Enforcement Act of 2015,
CONGRESS.GOV, https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2602/all-actions
(last visited Mar. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/7CFN-6G7D].
199. Dewey, supra note 1.
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II.B.1 covers criminal approaches, and Part II.B.2 covers state common law
doctrines that could provide relief to doxing subjects.
1. Criminal: Cyberstalking and Criminal Harassment
Most states, to some extent, have criminalized cyberstalking or have
applied criminal harassment statutes to online activity.200 This subsection
discusses state criminal laws that regulate cyberstalking and further
discusses the shortcomings with this approach.
a. Overview of State Criminal Statutes Regulating Doxing
Data on the enforcement of cyberstalking and harassment statutes are
hard to find because most states do not collect such data.201 Anecdotal
evidence from several states sheds some light on the strengths of state
criminal law as an effective remedy for doxing.
For example, in Commonwealth v. Johnson,202 two neighbors were in a
dispute over a property.203 Out of revenge, the defendant posted a false
Craigslist ad for free golf carts with the name, address, and phone number
of his neighbor, constituting an instance of punching down doxing.204
Thirty to forty people showed up at the subject’s home.205 Then the
defendant posted a false ad for an inexpensive motorcycle with a request to
call the neighbor’s cell phone after 10:00 p.m.206 The calls continued for
months, up to twenty calls every ten minutes.207
Massachusetts charged the defendant with conspiracy and criminal
harassment.208 The Massachusetts Supreme Court found that the criminal
harassment statute did not proscribe free speech, because it is “directed at a
course of conduct, rather than speech, ‘and the conduct it proscribes is not
The statute specifically
necessarily associated with speech.’”209
criminalizes “a knowing pattern of conduct . . . or series of acts . . . directed
at a specific person, which seriously alarms that person and would cause a
reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress.”210
When a statute “proscribes harassing and intimidating conduct, the
statute is not facially invalid under the First Amendment.”211 In addition, a

200. See CITRON, supra note 16, at 104. For a discussion of how state legislatures have
approached codifying cyberbullying (cyberharassment by and against school-age children),
see Matthew Fenn, Note, A Web of Liability: Does New Cyberbullying Legislation Put
Public Schools in a Sticky Situation?, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2729, 2753–55 (2013).
201. See CITRON, supra note 16, at 89.
202. 21 N.E.3d 937 (Mass. 2014).
203. See id. at 941.
204. See id. at 941–42.
205. See id. at 942.
206. See id.
207. See id.
208. See id. at 943.
209. Id. at 945 (quoting United States v. Petrovic, 701 F.3d 849, 856 (8th Cir. 2012)).
210. Id. at 944–45.
211. United States v. Osinger, 753 F.3d 939, 944 (9th Cir. 2014).
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statute can contain adequate safeguards to prevent its application to
protected speech.212
Moreover, the court found that “[t]he defendants cannot launder their
harassment of the [victims] through the Internet to escape liability.”213 The
Craigslist posts were not protected because they were “the equivalent of the
defendants recruiting others to harass the victims and the victims alone.”214
In all, the Massachusetts criminal harassment statute provided an effective
remedy for a specific doxing subject.
Several other states have effective criminal laws that can be used to
prosecute doxing. Maryland Criminal Code section 3-803 prohibits an
intentional, malicious course of conduct that constitutes harassment, as long
as the actor has received a reasonable warning or request to stop by or on
behalf of the subject.215
In addition, Utah Representative David E. Lifferth has introduced House
Bill 225, which modifies the existing criminal code to include cybercrimes
such as doxing, swatting, and denial of service attacks.216 The doxing
provision of House Bill 225 prohibits the publication of personal
If
identifying information, including name and home address.217
constitutional, this bill is an example of a state criminal statute that would
provide specific support to doxing subjects.
b. Limitations on the State’s Statutory Approach
The overarching problem facing the state statutory approach is the lack of
police awareness, training, care, and resources to help enforce and protect
because “even the most effectively drafted stalking and harassment laws
cannot do much if they are not enforced.”218 Specifically, victims report
that officers tend to lack awareness of the problems of cyberharassment and
doxing.219 When one journalist reported an online rape threat to police, the
responding officer asked her, “Why would anyone bother to do something
like that?” and declined to file a report.220 “That [her] stalker had said that

212. See CITRON, supra note 16, at 199–200.
213. Johnson, 21 N.E.3d at 948.
214. Id.
215. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-803 (West 2011).
216. Eugene Volokh, Utah ‘Anti-Doxxing’ Bill Would Outlaw Mentioning a Person’s
Name Online ‘With Intent to Offend,’ WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 2016),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2016/02/08/utah-antidoxxing-bill-would-outlaw-mentioning-a-persons-name-online-with-intent-to-offend
[https://perma.cc/GE86-62KK].
217. H.B. 225, 61st Leg., Gen. Sess. (Utah 2016) (cybercrime statute amendments).
218. CITRON, supra note 16, at 105; see also Merlan, supra note 6 (noting that Citron
argues that the biggest problem at the local level is the “lack of technical skills and training
for law enforcement officers”).
219. CITRON, supra note 16, at 88.
220. Amanda Hess, Why Women Aren’t Welcome on the Internet, PAC. STANDARD (Jan. 6,
2014), https://psmag.com/why-women-aren-t-welcome-on-the-internet-aa21fdbc8d6#.whla
vj6fd [https://perma.cc/L4CR-LKAY].
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he lived in [her] state, and had plans to seek [her] out at home, was
dismissed as just another online ruse.”221
The practical implications of protecting a subject from an online threat
also indicate the difficulty that law enforcement officers face in providing
relief. Many harassers are (at least initially) anonymous, and IP addresses
can be difficult to trace. As a result, officers sometimes report that they
believe they cannot offer assistance if the actor is outside the state or
locality.222 Another journalist who was doxed received an onslaught of
harassing messages and threats followed by an inundation of takeout orders
sent to her old apartment.223 When she went to the police to file a report,
the officer asked her, “[D]o we know where they physically are? We need
physical locations” and declined to file a report.224 Ultimately, “[t]he
advice that police give to victims is to stay offline.”225
The difficulty of pinpointing the location of an actor highlights the
importance of protecting doxing subjects. While the actor’s location may
be unknown, the location of the threatened attack becomes clear the
moment the actor doxes the subject.
Additional limitations apply to specific state statutes. For example, in
Massachusetts, the efficacy of the criminal harassment statute is limited by
the definition of a “course of conduct.”226 If an actor doxes a subject once,
causing extreme emotional distress, this action most likely would not
constitute a “course of conduct” and thus cannot be prosecuted under the
state criminal harassment statute. Further, many individual actors acting
alone would not fall within the meaning of “course of conduct” under a
Massachusetts-like statute.227 Another issue is that the proscribed activity
is conduct, not language. In Maryland, the criminal harassment statute
requires the victim to intercede and provide a “reasonable warning” to the
harasser.228
More generally, state laws punish “credible threats of violence.”229 Only
a few states “prohibit harassment communicated directly or indirectly, onor offline.”230 Accordingly, only a few state statutes currently reach
subjects who are bullied into silence where those subjects do not feel
221. Id.
222. See Merlan, supra note 6.
223. See id.
224. Id.
225. CITRON, supra note 16, at 84. This is an unacceptable solution. The state argues that
it cannot regulate malicious doxing because it is protected by freedom of speech. The state
then suggests that doxing subjects avoid the Internet—effectively silencing them. This
argument privileges the malicious speech of doxing actors over the speech of subjects and
approaches the viewpoint discrimination doctrine under the First Amendment. See R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 387 (1992).
226. CITRON, supra note 16, at 131.
227. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 265, § 43A(a) (2010).
228. MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-803 (West 2011).
229. CITRON, supra note 16, at 123 (citing Holcomb v. Virginia, 709 S.E.2d 711, 716 (Va.
Ct. App. 2011) (finding that public threats posted to a MySpace page can support a
conviction under the Virginia threat statute, where the defendants proclaimed that he “just
had to stab” the victim and “slit [her] neck into a fountain drink” (alteration in original))).
230. Id. at 124.
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“tangible, sustained, and immediate fear” of an “unequivocal,
unconditional, and specific” threat.231 If any of these exacting elements is
not met in a given scenario, current state criminal law cannot provide a
remedy for that doxing subject. Accordingly, current state criminal
approaches to doxing fall short of providing an effective legal remedy.
2. Common Law: Defamation, Harassment, and IIED
Common law approaches can provide a remedy for doxing. This
subsection briefly discusses three different common law torts that can apply
to doxing: defamation, harassment, and intentional infliction of emotional
distress (IIED).
a. Overview of Common Law Approaches
Tort law can cover some instances of doxing. In many ways it is an
appealing approach because of its “flexible dynamic structure,” which
“permit[s] technological innovation and change while controlling
undesirable behavior.”232 Culture and time influence societal expectations
and shared beliefs on privacy standards, so the judiciary’s ability to make
case-by-case determinations that incorporate common beliefs is critical to
finding an effective solution for malicious doxing.233
Some states recognize a cause of action for defamation that could apply
to doxing.234 In addition, harassment claims can provide some redress for
doxing subjects,235 as can the tort of intentionally or recklessly causing
severe emotional distress with extreme and outrageous conduct. This
standard sets a high bar for conduct, but “[h]umiliating, threatening, and
persistent online cruelty amounts to ‘extreme and outrageous’ activity
because it falls outside the norms of decency.”236
b. Limitations to Common Law Approaches
The overarching issue with the state common law approach is that it puts
the burden of enforcement on the doxing subject. The cost of a lawsuit
against a doxing actor is estimated at $10,000 to $60,000 and 500 hours of
labor.237 The subject would bear the entirety of these costs.

231. Id. at 123.
232. Natalie L. Regoli, Note, A Tort for Prying E-Eyes, 2001 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y
267, 277.
233. Id.
234. See, e.g., State Law: Defamation, DIGITAL MEDIA L. PROJECT, http://www.dmlp.org/
legal-guide/state-law-defamation (last visited Mar. 25, 2017) [https://perma.cc/438M-Z4SU].
235. See CITRON, supra note 16, at 121.
236. Id. (quoting Benjamin C. Zipurksy, Snyder v. Phelps, Outrageousness and the Open
Texture of Tort Law, 60 DEPAUL L. REV. 473 (2011)).
237. Jennifer T. Criss, Assoc., Drinker Biddle & Reath LLP, Remarks at the American
Bar Association Program on Doxing, Swatting, Trolls, and SJWs: Harassment and Gender
Discrimination on Social Media Platforms (Nov. 8, 2016) (on file with the Fordham Law
Review).
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Additional drawbacks include cause of action, scope, and high standards.
For example, defamation does not capture instances of doxing when the
information published is true, like a home address. In fact, even “[w]hen
people are lied about, they typically expect that some legal recourse will be
available, but are often sorely disappointed.”238
In addition, the “extreme and outrageous conduct” standard required for a
prima facie case of IIED is a high standard that restricts recovery for
extreme emotional distress more than recovery for physical harm.239 A
one-time tweet of a subject’s contact information likely would not rise to
the high bar set in IIED. For these reasons, the state common law approach
is an imperfect remedy for doxing subjects.
III. A BLENDED SOLUTION: PROPOSING A REMEDY WITH STATE AND
FEDERAL STATUTORY ELEMENTS
As discussed in Part II, neither state nor federal law provides a consistent
approach to deal with doxing, resulting in severe harm to doxing
subjects.240
While many types of online harassment—such as
impersonation, revenge pornography, and defamation—cause harm, doxing
puts victims in critical, physical danger. Doxing is a tool that moves purely
online harassment into the physical realm.241 Even though doxed
information can be publicly available, people should have the right to
control their contact information to keep themselves free from harassment,
threats, and living in fear.242 In addition, the Internet provides a platform to
amplify public information and to weaponize it.243 Accordingly, the best
solution to the lack of a doxing remedy involves (1) the widespread
adoption by lower federal courts of a recklessness standard for the Interstate
Communications Statute to encourage further enforcement and (2) the
adoption or amendment of state criminal laws criminalizing malicious
doxing under the true threat exception to the First Amendment. To support
the adoption of state criminal laws, Congress should pass federal legislation
providing funding for state and local law enforcement to train officers to
better enforce state cyberharassment law.
A. Lower Federal Courts Should Adopt a Recklessness Standard
for the Interstate Communications Statute
As discussed in Part II, the Interstate Communications Statute can be an
effective tool for prosecuting doxing;244 however, the statute has some

238. Ann Bartow, Internet Defamation as Profit Center: The Monetization of Online
Harassment, 32 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 383, 415 (2009).
239. See John J. Kircher, The Four Faces of Tort Law: Liability for Emotional Harm, 90
MARQ. L. REV. 789, 837 (2007).
240. See supra Part II.A–B.
241. See supra notes 28–39 and accompanying text.
242. See supra Part II.B.2.
243. See supra notes 28–39 and accompanying text.
244. See supra Part II.A.2.a.
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limitations.245 To overcome these limitations, the lower federal courts
should adopt a recklessness standard for the statute’s mens rea.246
The Supreme Court has made clear that speech can rise to a true threat
through a showing that the speaker purposefully or knowingly intended to
threaten the subject.247 However, recklessness will enable prosecutors to
look at the objective effect of the speech and its effect on the subject.248
Analysis of the totality of the circumstances, which a recklessness standard
would provide, will give dimension to online statements that could
otherwise be abstract and lacking in context. For such a test to truly
encompass all circumstances, it must consider the threat from a reasonable
person in the victim’s position.
In addition, the aggregate nature of communications on interactive
websites like Twitter make threats inherently riskier, which should
encourage a lower standard. This is important because all people should
have the right to free expression online, not just malicious actors.249
Freedom of expression should “extend[] to those who are too afraid to
participate in online activities and debates because of fear of harassment.
Their right to express themselves must be protected too.”250
More specifically, when an actor chooses to publish a subject’s home
address, she consciously disregards a substantial chance that her words will
be perceived as a threat because the publication of the home address moves
the harassment from the digital world into the real world, where physical
violence can take place.251 The act approaches a per se true threat because
it creates particularity by specifying a location of harm. Of course, an
address dox alone, without more, would likely not constitute a true threat.
It must be accompanied by a pattern of conduct that includes harassment
and particularized threats. Under this solution, the harassment and dox of
Brianna Wu would constitute a true threat and be actionable.252
Accordingly, the recklessness standard will help to make § 875(c) more
broadly applicable to doxing cases.

245. See supra Part II.A.2.b.
246. See Maria A. Brusco, Read This Note or Else!: Conviction Under 18 U.S.C.
§ 875(c) for Recklessly Making a Threat, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 2845, 2870 (2016). But see
United States v. Elonis, 841 F.3d 589, 596 (3d Cir. 2016) (declining to specify whether
recklessness suffices, but finding that § 875(c) contains both a subjective and objective
component); supra note 148 and accompanying text.
247. See Elonis v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2001, 2012–13 (2015).
248. See supra Part II.A.2.
249. Emma Morris, Online Harassment: Testing the Limits of Free Speech, FAM. ONLINE
SAFETY INST. (July 26, 2016), https://www.fosi.org/policy-research/online-harassmenttesting-limits-free-speech/ [https://perma.cc/WG4E-3XPN].
250. Id.
251. CITRON, supra note 16, at 102.
252. See supra Part II.
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B. States Should Criminalize the Malicious Publication
of Personal Information
In addition to strengthening the application of existing federal statutes, a
comprehensive approach to providing a remedy for malicious doxing would
also include new or amended state criminal legislation. State legislation
would work in concert with the federal Interstate Stalking and Interstate
Communications Statutes because it can be more narrowly tailored. These
state laws will fill gaps that cannot be covered by the federal legislation.
It is well established that “‘the basic principles of freedom of speech and
the press, like the First Amendment’s command, do not vary’ when a new
and different medium for communication appears.”253 Even so, remedies
are possible under established exceptions to the First Amendment because
“developments in technology influence the appropriate interpretation of
constitutional rights.”254 Accordingly, the First Amendment “need not be
intentionally blind to the way the Internet has changed the way we interact
with one another.”255 New or amended legislation does not need to be
restricted to a course of conduct because, as argued in Part III.A, doxes of a
person’s home address come close to approximating a true threat on their
own and thus can be regulated.256
State criminalization of doxing is also a more practical solution because
subjects call 911 and hope for immediate police intervention when they are
threatened. Police, however, have no clear guidelines on how to respond to
cybersecurity issues and thus fail to help doxing subjects. Having succinct
state laws will enable officers to meet the needs of doxed citizens the
moment harassment is reported.
State criminal laws also provide maximum flexibility without burdening
doxing subjects. They are preferable over a common law remedy because
criminal laws remove the procedural and practical bars to relief.257
Criminal statutes serve as a “route to deterrence” that does not “put all the
burden on victims.”258
States can look to proposed federal legislation for guidance on how to
best craft a criminal doxing statute.259 At the federal level, other
comparable solutions include swatting hoaxes legislation, the Clark bill,260
and the Speier revenge porn bill.261 These three legislative solutions
253. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 790 (2011) (quoting Joseph Burstyn,
Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 503 (1952)).
254. Leong & Morando, supra note 34, at 131.
255. Id.
256. See discussion supra Part III.A.
257. See supra Part II.B.2.
258. Emily Bazelon, Why Do We Tolerate Revenge Porn?, SLATE (Sept. 25, 2013, 6:21
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/double_x/doublex/2013/09/revenge_porn_legislation_
a_new_bill_in_california_doesn_t_go_far_enough.html [https://perma.cc/5UAS-T6ZP].
259. See supra Part II.A.4.
260. See discussion supra Part II.A.4.
261. See Franks, supra note 10; see also Rep. Speier Plans to Reintroduce Revenge Porn
Bill in 2017, IAPP (Oct. 3, 2016), https://iapp.org/news/a/rep-speier-plans-to-reintroducerevenge-porn-bill-in-2017/ [https://perma.cc/LF6P-LGP7].
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provide direction to law enforcement to increase funding and training
relating to lesser-known types of online harassment. These solutions are
excellent models for how states should attempt to legislate against home
address doxes.
Trained, knowledgeable officers can help to overcome threats and make
doxing subjects feel safe. To assist states with the enforcement of
malicious doxing statutes, Congress should support Representative Clark’s
law enforcement training bill, providing resources to state and local police
departments and prosecutors’ offices to ensure that states have the funding
they need to enforce newly created or amended laws.262
CONCLUSION
The malicious publication of personal information is an online
harassment tool that causes unique and serious real-world harms. While the
law currently provides effective remedies for subjects who are doxed for
political purposes, current federal and state approaches do not provide a
consistent, effective legal remedy for purely malicious doxing. Lower
federal courts should adopt a recklessness standard for interpreting the
interstate communications statute to facilitate enforcement of malicious
doxing cases. In addition, states should create criminal laws that offer
maximum flexibility and train officers to assist and protect doxing subjects.
The increasing use and newsworthiness of malicious doxing as a tool to
harass and silence indicates that the time has come to ensure protections are
in place so that people can use the Internet without fear of physical
violence.

262. See discussion supra Part II.B.1.

